Tuesday, July 03, 2007

Jackpot! Origin of JTTFs and counter intelligence in document

Which is related to the previous four posts, which go into some detail, especially the post entitled "Homeland Security started in 1999" . This file is what I'm getting this from, which is also available through the title link. Notice the date: this was established in '98s, although it's been rolled into the Department of Homeland Security, along with the NDPO, which I talk about in the previous posts. So...it looks like all the functions, along with an organizational structure similar to that of the Department of Homeland Security existed from '99.

Intelligence Collection and Local Capabilities

OBJECTIVE: Increase State And Local Awareness And Intelligence-Gathering
Capabilities Regarding Terrorist Activity
While the ability of state and local agencies to acquire information about terrorist
activity in their regions has increased as a result of recent federal outreach efforts, challenges
remain. As indicated by the responses to the State and Local Questionnaire, state and local law
enforcement and non-law enforcement agencies, such as emergency responders, agree that they
would benefit from more training and information about terrorism, particularly information that
is regional in focus, or that addresses emerging issues such as cyber-terrorism, or the use of
chemical or biological weapons. Such training and information sharing would help local
agencies focus their own counter-terrorism law enforcement and intelligence efforts. It would
be especially beneficial to those agencies that do not have strong intelligence gathering
capabilities. Particularly in rural areas, local law enforcement agencies may not have sufficient
personnel to support their own intelligence unit or even to participate in federal
intelligence-sharing task forces. Similarly, state and local law enforcement agencies may not
have the equipment or training to take advantage of existing electronic systems for

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communicating intelligence information. Another obstacle to effective communication is that
intelligence gathered by federal agencies is often classified and, therefore, federal agencies
must either facilitate the necessary security clearances or sanitize the information of its
classified details.

Expand Joint Terrorism Task Forces And Related Federal Efforts To
Improve Communications Among Federal, State And Local Law
Enforcement Agencies
For most state and local agencies, the primary federal source of information and
intelligence about terrorist activities is the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
obtains intelligence from a variety of sources including intelligence agencies such as the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the FBI's own intelligence gathering and law enforcement
operations, as well as the operations of other agencies such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (ATF) and the Customs Service; and, to a lesser extent, from state and local law
enforcement agencies.
The FBI uses several means of communicating terrorism information to state and local
agencies. When intelligence information reveals a potential terrorist threat, the FBI relies on the
Terrorist Threat Warning System (TTWS) to get vital information to the U.S. counter-terrorism
and law enforcement community. If the threat information warrants broad dissemination, the
FBI can quickly transmit unclassified messages to state and local law enforcement agencies
nationwide over the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS).
information that is less urgent, the FBI can communicate through the Law Enforcement
On-Line (LEO) system. These systems are a critical link in the federal/state/local
counter-terrorism partnership. They should be continued at robust levels.
While state and local law enforcement authorities appreciate receiving such vital
information in a timely fashion,
many identify a need for regular periodic intelligence analysis
and reports, particularly concerning groups operating in their jurisdiction. FBI field offices
routinely share information through their ongoing working relationships with state and local
law enforcement agencies. To strengthen these existing relationships and improve
communication about terrorism issues, the FBI created Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFS) as
a mechanism for interaction between federal agencies and their state and local level
counterparts in specific jurisdictions. The JTTFs, which exist in 18 major metropolitan areas,
are composed of state and local officials, and local representatives from the FBI and other
federal agencies, such as ATF, the Customs Service, the Secret Service and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS). Participants work together, usually on a full-time basis, to
gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence, and to jointly investigate terrorist activity. The
FBI also recently established a regional terrorism task force to serve several rural states with

See Appendix: State and Local Questionnaire, responses to question 5.
Similarly, warnings can be sent using the Awareness of National Security Issues and
Response (ANSIR) program, which utilizes the Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) system and
is designed to provide unclassified national security threat and warning information to U.S.
corporate security directors and executives, law enforcement, and other government agencies.
Appendix: State and Local Questionnaire, responses to questions 4-9.

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common terrorism concerns. In addition to ongoing intelligence sharing, these task forces
sponsor regional terrorism conferences to train local law enforcement agencies about the
terrorism threat in their region. These face-to-face working arrangements not only improve the
flow of information from federal intelligence agencies to localities, but they allow federal
agencies to obtain intelligence from local sources.
The existing 18 JTTFs involve participation by approximately 260 full- and part-time
federal, state and local personnel plus 420 FBI agents. State and local law enforcement
personnel endorse such federal, state and local joint efforts. Many report that they would
participate in JTTFs if they were available to them.
Based on local interest and an assessment
of terrorist activity, creation of a dozen additional JTTFs over the next three years may warrant
In the State and Local Questionnaire, 69% responded yes to this question. See
Appendix, responses to question 3.
Where appropriate, over the next five years, the FBI also will establish domestic
terrorism working groups in field offices. Such working groups would provide a supplemental
means of increasing cooperation and intelligence-sharing among federal, state, and local law
enforcement officials. They would be particularly important in those parts of the country where
there are not enough state and local resources to support full-time JTTFs. No additional funding
is required for this initiative.

Assist Local Law Enforcement Agencies To Identify And Gain Access To
State And Federal Intelligence Systems
Many local law enforcement agencies report that the lack of resources to support their
own intelligence infrastructure is a real barrier to effective counter-terrorism efforts. Often the
problem is as basic as the inability to spare officers to perform intelligence activities. To some
extent, participation in JTTFs can address this need because the FBI makes overtime money
available to compensate state and local participants. However, this cannot redress the problems
faced by many small town or county law enforcement agencies, which may have only a handful
of officers to perform all duties. Ideally, at a minimum, a local law enforcement office unable
to perform its own intelligence activities should have access to a state or regional electronic
information system that provides real-time, accurate intelligence, a system that should include
timely federal information on criminal and terrorist activity. However, even this solution often
is out of reach for local police or sheriffs offices because of the lack of resources to procure
computers, appropriate software or the training needed to acquire access to electronic
information systems, or because of the unavailability of a reliable, centralized repository of

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Within the next fiscal year, the FBI, in cooperation with associations representing state
and local law enforcement agencies and with the advice of the Intelligence and Assistance to
State and Local Authorities working groups of the NSC s WMDP Group, should determine the
extent to which local law enforcement agencies do not have access to such systems; identify
existing successful methods of bridging such gaps; and develop concrete proposals to
strengthen these vital state and local capabilities.
An example of an existing federal program that has improved state and local intelligence
gathering capabilities is a cooperative arrangement between the FBI and the Alaska Department
of Public Safety, Division of State Troopers. Since 1995, the FBI and the state have operated,
under FBI auspices, a Statewide Law Enforcement Information Center (SLEIC). The SLEIC
combines analysts from the Alaska State Troopers under FBI management at an FBI supported
site. It gathers intelligence from multiple sources in a centralized database with full text query
capability in order to give state law enforcement agencies efficient access to current and
historical information. One of its specific goals is to provide immediate on-scene information
management support for administrative and operational activities during a critical incident,
such as a terrorist threat.

Develop More Effective Means Of Sharing Classified Information With
State And Local Law Enforcement And Emergence Response Agencies
Even where mechanisms for developing and sharing terrorist information exist, state
and local officials express frustration because of their belief that critical information is often
denied or delayed because it has been classified. This problem is greatly diminished in areas
with JTTFs because all federal, state and local law enforcement participants must obtain Top
Secret clearances before joining a task force. Law enforcement agencies in general are likely to
have personnel with necessary security clearances, which means that this perceived problem
may be alleviated through better working relationships between FBI field offices and their state
and local counterparts. Thus, expansion of JTTFs and similar cooperative arrangements may go
a long way toward solving this problem. Nonetheless, other solutions may be needed. The FBI
should assess the degree to which security restrictions on dissemination of information have
impeded its work with local law enforcement agencies and whether the FBI needs to pursue
additional remedies, such as greater efforts to sanitize classified information and report such
information on a more regular basis.

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Lack of access to classified information may be an obstacle to non-law enforcement
agencies as well. Many emergency responders believe that security restrictions on information
possessed by the federal government have prevented dissemination of sufficiently detailed
information to allow them to plan or react appropriately in an emergency.
On the other hand,
many members of the intelligence community believe that much intelligence information is not
relevant to planning or response needs, and that there are mechanisms for sharing essential
The need to protect national security information from unnecessary disclosure must be
carefully balanced against the need to ensure timely and adequate dissemination of relevant
intelligence to state and local first responder officials who are ultimately responsible for the
safety of their communities. Emergency responders ordinarily cannot participate in JTTFs
because the JTTFs actively investigate terrorist crimes and accordingly, their membership must
be restricted to law enforcement personnel.
To increase confidence among the emergency response community that federal agencies
are sharing necessary intelligence, and thereby increase intergovernmental coordination, new
approaches are needed. The appropriate working groups within the NSC's WMDP Group,
drawing on the expertise of national security and public safety specialists from the federal, state
and local government levels, should study the feasibility of establishing a system for granting
the necessary security clearances to a small number of senior public safety personnel so that
they can access to classified information relating to terrorist threats as needed.
At a
minimum each state and the nation s most heavily populated urban areas should be assured
access. This assessment should have no budget implications.
A closely related issue is the extent, if any, to which restricted information needs to be
shared with security officers in certain critical private sectors, such as the nuclear power
industry. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the critical infrastructure
In response to the State and Local Questionnaire, a substantial number of law
enforcement, emergency response and medical personnel identified issues of inadequate
information sharing and the lack of security clearances as factors that limit the usefulness of
information or threat assessments obtained from the federal government. These state and local
personnel seek more timely dissemination of more localized and specific information. See
Appendix, responses to questions 6 and 9.
One such proposal has been advanced by the Competency Panel on Civil Integration
and Response of the Defense Science Board. See Report of the Competency Panel on Civil
Integration and Response at page 16. This Panel, proposes that an average of three to five
public safety personnel who are responsible for planning and directing the public safety effort
in the community, rather than political leaders, be provided with security clearances for the
purpose of receiving this classified information. Under this proposal, access to classified
documents would be restricted to reviewing the material at cleared facilities maintained by the
federal government (such as an FBI field office, Secret Service office, U.S. Marshal s Service
office or military installation). The cleared public safety personnel could be notified of the need
to review a classified threat analysis either by personal visits from locally based federal agents
or by unclassified messages instructing them to report to a secure facility to access the
particular material.

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private sector liaisons developed under PDD 63 are required to establish effective threat
warning and security information systems to serve key infrastructures.
As these systems are
established, the NSC s Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group should assess the need for
dissemination of classified information to security personnel in these sensitive areas. The
National Coordinator and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Of flee will also play key roles
in assessing the need for dissemination of classified information.
Another hindrance to intelligence dissemination is uncertainty about which
organizations have equipment and storage capability for classified information. Many local law
enforcement and most emergency response agencies lack secure communications equipment
and secure storage for sensitive or classified information. As part of its assessment of other
barriers to intelligence sharing. the FBI will assess whether lack of equipment is a significant
barrier to effective exchange of intelligence. If so, the FBI should recommend appropriate
remedial actions which can be coordinated through the NDPO"


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